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Delaware Strikes Back:
Newcastle Partners and the Fight for State
Corporate Autonomy
MICHAEL W. OTT*

ABRAHAM. Do you bite your thumb at us, sir?
SAMSON. I do bite my thumb, sir.
ABRAHAm. Do you bite your thumb at us, sir?
SAMSON, to Gregory. Is the law of our side if I say 'Ay'?
GREGORY. No.

SAMsoN, to Abraham.
No sir, I do not bite my thumb at you, sir, but I bite my
1
thumb, sir.

INTRODUCTION
For the better part of the twentieth century, Delaware has dominated the American
corporate boardroom. 2 However, recent corporate scandals have awoken the federal
giant. With the Securities and Exchange Commission's (SEC) new mandate under
Sarbanes-Oxley, is the era of Delaware's corporate dominance at an end?
Historically, Congress has left the regulation of the internal governance of
corporations to the states.3 Under the internal affairs doctrine, "[s]tates ... create

corporations... prescribe their powers, and.., define the rights that are acquired by
purchasing their shares. ' 4 Once a business chooses a state in which to incorporate, only
the laws of that state govem the internal affairs of the corporation. 5 Therefore,
corporate managers have an incentive to incorporate in the state that the managers
believe will provide the cheapest legal and business environment. At the same time,
states receive tax revenue for each corporate charter granted. 6 The internal affairs
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1. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, ROMEO AND JULIET act 1, sc.1.

2. Professor Ahdieh has gone so far as to declare that Delaware enacts the nation's
corporate law. Robert B. Ahdieh, From "Federalization"to "Mixed Governance" in Corporate
Law: A Defense of Sarbanes-Oxley, 53 BuFF. L. REv. 721, 736 (2005).
3. See CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp., 481 U.S. 69,90-91 (1987); see also VantagePoint
Venture Partners 1996 v. Examen, Inc., 871 A.2d 1108, 1112 (Del. 2005); J. Robert Brown, Jr.,
The Irrelevanceof State CorporateLaw in the Governance ofPublicCompanies, 38 U. RICH. L.
REv. 317, 321-22 (2004).

4. CTS,481U.S. at9l.
5. Id.at 90.

6. Delaware charges $89 to file a one-page certificate of incorporation, $9 for each
additional page, and $30 for each certified copy. For a full schedule of fees, see DELAWARE
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doctrine has, therefore, created an environment in which all fifty states compete for a
share of the corporate chartering business.7
In the debate about the effect this competition has on state laws, two schools of
thought exist. The first argues that since management makes the ultimate decision
where to incorporate (or reincorporate), states amend their corporate codes to favor
management at the expense of shareholders.8 This school calls the competitive push to
please management the "race for the bottom." 9 The second school of thought argues
that businesses choose to incorporate in states that are best able "to adapt [their]
corporate code[s] to changing business circumstances."' 0 This school believes that
adaptability of state law creates a more efficient business environment, decreases costs,
and, ultimately, increases value for shareholders." 1This school terms the competition a
"race ... to the top.' 12
For the better part of the last century, the state of Delaware has dominated this
3
competition. Delaware has a reputation for being most responsive to corporate needs.'
Over fifty percent of all publicly traded companies 14 and sixty percent of Fortune 500
companies are incorporated in Delaware, 15 though Delaware's 843,000 residents
account for only 0.28% of the population of the United States.1 6 If there is, as many
commentators have suggested, a "race" to capture the franchise taxes of American
corporations,17 Delaware has won. Delaware is usually the first state to respond to the
needs of the market, but even when it does not, its ability to imitate allows quick
adoption of successful corporate innovations from competitor states and erases any
incentives for Delaware corporations to reincorporate elsewhere.' 8 Delaware's success

1 (2006), http://www.
state.de.us/corp/newfee.pdf. In 2004, Delaware collected $568,190,000 on corporate licenses.
U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
STATE GOVERNMENT TAX COLLECTIONS: 2004 (2004),
http://www.census.gov/govs/ statetax/0408destax.html. For further discussion, see infra notes
128-30 and accompanying text.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE: DIvIsIoN OF CORPORATIONs FEE SCHEDULE

7. See ROBERTA ROMANO, THE GENIUs OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW 5 (1993).
8. William L. Cary, Federalism and CorporateLaw: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83

L.J. 663, 666 (1974).
9. Id.

YALE

10. ROMANO, supra note 7, at 9.
11. See id. at 14-16.
12. Id. at 14.

13. Id. at 16.
14. A publicly traded company is "[a] corporation whose shares are traded to and among
the general public." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 367 (8th ed. 2004).

15. State of Delaware, Division of Corporations Home Page, http://www.state.de.us/
corp/default.shtml (last visited Jan. 12, 2006).
16. See Delaware State & County QuickFacts from the U.S. Census Bureau, http://
quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/10000.html (last visited Jan. 12, 2006) (listing population
estimates for 2005).
17. For further discussion of this debate, see infra Part I.C.
18. For further discussion of this debate, see infra Part I.C. Delaware's utter dominance of
this competition suggests that it may be more appropriate to call this "race" a "clone war." Since
no state can realistically beat Delaware at its own game, the best a state can hope to do is clone
the Delaware business environment and hold on to businesses already incorporated in the state.
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at monopolizing the market for franchise fees has led some to refer to Delaware's
corporate code as its "chartering business."' 19
The story of American corporate law is not, however, exclusively state-dominated.
After the stock market crash of 1929, the federal government enacted legislation that
federalized securities laws. 20 Since that time, there has been an uneasy "agreement"
between the states and the federal government. The states regulate the internal
governance of a corporation, and the federal government, through delegation to the
SEC, regulates a company's external affairs-that is, the relationship between the
company and the market.2'
However, the federally created boundary between internal and external affairs is
rather artificial. For example, the SEC has heavily regulated the requirements for
holding an annual meeting, the quintessential internal affair.22 As one may expect with
artificial distinctions,
courts are frequently left to sort out the unclear lines of
23
demarcation.

With its lead secure against competition from other states, Delaware's greatest
concern is that the federal government will intervene and preempt its corporate law,
thus destroying Delaware's chartering business in one fell swoop. 24 Delaware has far
more corporate franchise tax income to lose from federal preemption than any other
state.25 Therefore, Delaware has warily eyed the SEC and Congress whenever
confronting a question that might draw federal scrutiny.26
Since the Enron and WorldCom accounting scandals in 2002, the threat of total
federal preemption of state regulation of internal corporate governance has become
immediate. In response to these scandals, Congress enacted the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002 ("Sarbanes-Oxley"). 27 This Act gave the SEC
new power to regulate various
28
aspects of the internal governance of corporations.

19. See, e.g., Mark J. Roe, Delaware's Competition, 117 HARv. L. REv. 588, 592 (2003).
20. The most notable examples are the Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38,48 Stat. 74 (codified
as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (2000)) and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch.
404, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78nn (2000)).
21. See Mark J. Loewenstein, The Quiet Transformation of Corporate Law, 57 SMU L.
REV. 353,354 (2004).
22. See infra note 56 and accompanying text.
23. See Roe, supra note 19, at 610.
24. See William W. Bratton, Delaware Law as Applied Public Choice Theory: Bill Cary
andthe Basic CourseAfter Twenty-five Years, 34 GA. L. REv. 447,464-65 (2000); Roe, supra
note 19 (explaining that the federal government has almost always been Delaware's greatest
competitor).
25. See Bratton, supra note 24, at 457 ("Delaware, as the entity most dependent on
corporate law revenues, is the contracting state most prone to view that possibility as a threat.").
26. See Roe, supra note 19, at 604-07.
27. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in scattered
sections of 11, 15, 18, 28 & 29 U.S.C. (2006)).
28. See Ahdieh, supra note 2, at 723-24; Roberta S. Karmel, Realizing the Dream of
William 0. Douglas-TheSecurities and Exchange Commission Takes Charge of Corporate
Governance,30 DEL. J. CoRp. L. 79, 81, 101-03 (2005) ("The SEC's new activism with respect
to corporate governance can thus be analyzed as the latest maneuver in a long running battle
between federal and state authorities over the regulation of public corporations.").
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With the ongoing federal intrusion into traditionally state-controlled law, it was only
a matter of time before the Delaware courts encountered a direct conflict between
Delaware and federal corporate law. This question arose in November of 2005 in
Newcastle Partnersv. Vesta Insurance Group.29 While the Delaware court probably
arrived at the correct result, in the process it "bit its thumb" at the federal government
and implied that Delaware's corporate lawmaking power is equal-or even superiorto that of the federal government.
This Note discusses the Court of Chancery of Delaware's action in Newcastle
Partners,and concludes that it is the first volley in what could be a long power struggle
between Delaware and the SEC. Part I delineates the historical development of
corporate law over the last century by starting with corporate law as it existed before
the Great Depression and continuing through the enactment of Sarbanes-Oxley. Part II
examines more closely Delaware's role at the center of the incorporation business.
Finally, Part III dissects the Newcastle Partnersopinion and concludes that the opinion
achieves the right result, but under the wrong conceptual framework. The framework
chosen by the Court of Chancery-the internal affairs doctrine of conflicts of law-suggests that Delaware has corporate law-giving power equal orsuperiorto the federal
government's. While the result achieved in Newcastle Partnersis correct, Delaware
risks the fury of the SEC and the federal government if it extends this reasoning to
future cases. To avoid these results, the SEC must soon take an opportunity to assert its
ultimate authority over state corporate law.
I. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF CORPORATE LAW OVER THE LAST CENTURY

The last century saw modem corporate law develop from trust-busting and the
creation of federal antitrust laws in the late nineteenth century to Enron, WorldCom,
and the accounting scandals of the early twenty-first century. This history is primarily
the story of Delaware
law responding to both horizontal (competing states) and vertical
30
(federal) pressure.
A. Pre-SEC Corporateand Securities Law and the Wilson Presidency
The corporate-chartering business began in the late nineteenth century as states
began to liberalize their corporate codes. 31 First, states removed statutory limitations on
corporate duration, size, and purpose.32 Eventually, states amended their corporate
codes to shift authority within corporations from shareholders to managers.33
At the turn of the twentieth century, the premier corporate law policy debate
centered on big trusts such as Standard Oil. Standard Oil sought to control the oil

29. 887 A.2d 975 (Del. Ch.), aff'd, 906 A.2d 807 (Del. 2005) (unpublished table
decision).
30. Compare ROMANO, supra note 7, at 9-11 (discussing how the fifty states compete with
Delaware for the corporate-chartering business) with Bratton, supra note 24, at 457-58
(explaining how the threat of federal intervention provides incentives for Delaware to respond to
shareholder needs over management's wishes).
31. See Brown, supra note 3, at 335.
32. Id.
33. Id.
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market by purchasing oil companies throughout the United States. However, states did
not allow in-state corporations to own stock in out-of-state corporations. 34 In response,
Standard Oil organized a cartel to control oil prices. 35 After the cartel proved unstable,
Standard Oil entered into a series of
trust agreements through which it could control
36
most of the American oil industry.
Some states, such as Ohio, did not like the trust, and sought to insulate the Ohio
branch of Standard Oil from the trust agreement. The Ohio Attorney General
successfully attacked the trust in the Ohio Supreme Court on the grounds that Ohio, as
the incorporating state, had not given Standard Oil of Ohio the right to enter into a trust
arrangement.37 Other states took this opportunity to attempt to attract the corporations
being driven out of states like Ohio. New Jersey stepped onto the scene as the first state
to attract a large number of corporations through the "liberalization" of its corporate
law.38
New Jersey "liberalized" its corporate law to allow New Jersey corporations to buy
stock in out-of-state corporations. 39 This allowed New Jersey to attract large corporate
combinations such as Standard Oil. Other states saw New Jersey's success and raced to
adopt its corporate innovations. 40 Delaware was among those states that followed' New
41
Jersey's lead, but "firms were happy with New Jersey and generally stayed put. "
However, national politics brought New Jersey's dominance to a sudden end;
surprisingly, the key to Delaware's eventual supremacy was the presidential candidacy
of Woodrow Wilson.42 During the 1912 presidential campaign, Theodore Roosevelt
campaigned against Woodrow Wilson, the governor ofNew Jersey, on the grounds that
Wilson had talked about cleaning up the corporate law of New Jersey, but had not
acted.43 This prompted Wilson to push the New Jersey legislature to adopt more
restrictive corporate law.44 Once New Jersey changed its law, the majority of
businesses incorporated in New Jersey reincorporated in neighboring Delaware.45
B. The Securities Act of 1933 and Securities Exchange Act of 1934
After the stock market crash in 1929 and the resulting depression, Congress,
disgruntled by the resulting laxity of state corporate law, took it upon itself to plug

34. See Roe, supra note 19, at 608.
35.
36.
37.
38.

Id.
Id.
Id.(citing State ex rel. Attorney Gen. v. Standard Oil Co., 30 N.E. 279 (Ohio 1892)).
See id.
at 609.

39. Id.
40. See id.
41.
42.
43.
44.

Id.
1d.at 609-10.
Id.at 609.
Id.at 609-10.

45. See Cary,supra note 8, at 664; Roe, supranote 19, at 610. It should be noted that the
excesses of the trust era led to the first important federalization of state corporate law. In
response to the initial liberalization by New Jersey, in 1890 Congress passed the Sherman Act,
ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (2000)). Roe, supra note

19, at 609. This Act substantially limited the abilities of corporations to combine when the
combination would restrain interstate trade.
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holes in state regulations through which management could retain control of a
corporation to its advantage.46 Specifically, Congress believed that the increased power
of managers had led to an environment in which managers kept shareholders in the
dark about many important aspects of the business, thus enabling managers to remain
in office and to profit at the expense of shareholders.47 In response to this, Congress
passed the Securities Act of 193348 ("1933 Act") and the Securities Exchange Act of
193449 ("1934 Act"). The 1933 Act regulated the primary market-the market in which
securities issuers initially sold securities to the general public.50 The 1934 Act created
the SEC to administer the securities laws through the issuance of regulations, regulated
proxy solicitations, and regulation of the secondary market-the market for the resale
of securities.5
Federal securities law is based on the principle of disclosure.5 2 "Full disclosure
regulation is based on the often quoted theory that '[p]ublicity is justly commended as
a remedy for social and industrial diseases. Sunlight is said to be the best of
disinfectants; electric light the most efficient policeman."'' 5 3 This emphasis on
disclosure over substantive regulation, while hotly debated at the time of its
enactment,5 4 has become the gospel of the federal and state balance in the corporate

46. See Brown, supranote 3, at 336-37.
at 336.
47. See id.
48. Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38,48 Stat. 74 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a77aa (2000)).
49. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. §§ 78a-78nn (2000)).
50.

WILLIAM A. KLEIN ET AL., BuSINESs AssocIATIONS: AGENCY, PARTNERSHIPS, AND

CORPORATIONS 403 (5th ed. 2003).

51. Id.at 403-04. Many sections of the 1934 Act are practically devoid of any substance.
Congress delegated responsibility for the substance of the law to the SEC. For example, the
regulation dealing with proxy solicitations states:
It shall be unlawful for any person, by the use of the mails or by any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce or of any facility of a national securities
exchange or otherwise, in contravention of such rules and regulationsas the
Commission may prescribeas necessary or appropriatein the public interestor

for the protection of investors, to solicit or to permit the use of his name to solicit
any proxy or consent or authorization in respect of any security (other than an
exempted security) registered pursuant to section 781 of this title.
15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (emphasis added). Therefore, the conflict is never so much between the

states and Congress as it is between the states and the SEC. Moreover, the 1934 Act limits its
periodic disclosure requirements to corporations with total assets over $1,000,000 and more
than 500 shareholders. 15 U.S.C. § 781(g)(1).
52. Karmel, supra note 28, at 82. For example, 15 U.S.C. § 77f (2000 & Supp. II 2002)

requires the registration of securities. "Any security may be registered with the Commission
under the terms and conditions hereinafter provided, by filing a registration statement." 15
U.S.C. § 77f(a). "The information contained in or filed with any registration statement shall be

made available to the public under such regulations as the Commission may prescribe." 15
U.S.C. § 77f(d).
53. Karmel, supra note 28, at 82 n.5 (alteration in original) (quoting Louis D. BRANDEIS,
OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY AND How THE BANKERS USE IT 92 (1914)).

54. See id. at 82-83.
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regulation debate." The SEC, the agency that regulates securities, has limited power
beyond the ability to enforce this disclosure system.
However, even with its seemingly limited mandate, the SEC has, in fact,
promulgated a great deal of regulation dealing with the internal governance of a
corporation. For example, the SEC has heavily regulated the proxy solicitation process.
To elect a board of directors, a corporation often has to solicit proxy votes from its
shareholders to reach quorum. The SEC, concerned that companies did not provide
shareholders with information adequate to make an informed vote, required
corporations to publish an annual report before they could solicit proxies. In response
to this regulation, many companies stopped s Mliciting for proxy votes and, instead,
began relying on management votes and a smaller number of shareholders to reach
quorum. The SEC then required companies to issue an annual report before they could
elect directors, regardless of the corporation's intent to solicit proxies. The result of
these regulations is that the SEC dictates what information a corporation must disclose
before it can engage in the quintessential internal affairs act: shareholder control ofthe
board of directors.56
C. ProfessorCary and the "Race to the Bottom" Debate
Some, such as Supreme Court Justice William 0. Douglas, believed that the federal
securities laws of the early 1930s did not go far enough to solve the excesses of the
Roaring Twenties.57 Although there was a push to include federal incorporation as part
of the New Deal, the push ultimately failed.58 Under the haze of prosperity of the postWorld War II boom, the federal incorporation movement went into a period of deep
hibernation.
In the 1970s, under the shadow of the turmoil surrounding the Watergate scandal,
Professor Bill Cary of Columbia University picked up the federalization gauntlet. In a
highly influential article, 59 Professor Cary argued that the competition among the states
for corporate franchise fees had become a "race for the bottom, ' 60and, therefore, the
in the regulation of the internal
federal government should become involved
61
governance of publicly held companies.

55. See Roe, supra note 19, at 596; cf ROMANO, supra note 7, at 3-4 (discussing federal
disclosure requirements in relation to state securities laws and highlighting the corporate
governance versus disclosure distinction).
56. See Roe, supra note 19, at 612 (quoting ARTHUR R. PINTO & DOUGLAS M. BRANSON,
UNDERSTANDING CORPORATE LAW 148 (1999)). The SEC's proxy regulations are the basis ofthe
conflict in Newcastle Partnersv. Vesta Insurance Group, 887 A.2d 975 (Del. Ch.), aff'd, 906
A.2d 807 (Del. 2005) (unpublished table decision), and are discussed more fully infra Part III.
57. See Karmel, supra note 28, at 83.
58. For a contemporaneous argument against federal incorporation, see Harris Berlack,
FederalIncorporationand Securities Regulation, 49 HARv. L. REv. 386 (1936).
59. Cary, supra note 8. In 1991, the Yale Law Journalpublished a list of the Yale Law
Journalarticles most-cited between 1956 and 1989. Professor Cary's article ranked as the
fourteenth most-cited article. Fred R. Shapiro, The Most-Cited Articles from The Yale Law
Journal, 100 YALE L.J. 1449, 1462 (1991).
60. Cary, supra note 8, at 666.
61. Id. at 701-02.
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The race model of state corporate law assumes that each state, to maximize
franchise tax revenues, adopts laws to attract businesses to incorporate within their
state. Whenever one state adopts a new, more attractive law, other states will "race" to
adopt an even more attractive law. Professor Cary argued that since managers
ultimately choose where to incorporate, states have an ongoing incentive to adopt laws
that are the most permissive toward managers. As the race reached its conclusion, the
country would be left with an environment in which no state polices the actions of
business managers-the bottom, as far as Professor Cary was concerned.62
Professor Cary acknowledged that Delaware was the leader in corporate
"innovation," and, therefore, the wirner of this race. 63 He argued that Delaware's
primary public policy regarding business had been to relax manager fiduciary standards
and standards of fairness as much as possible to foster incorporation in Delaware. 64
Cary contrasted this pro-management attitude with contemporaneous federal case law
and concluded that the federal government was much more concerned than Delaware
about the rights of shareholders. 65 Cary stopped short of proposing federal
incorporation, but suggested the creation of federal66minimum standards for manager
fiduciary duties and internal corporate governance.
Cary's article prompted a great deal of response. Judge Ralph Winter of the Second
Circuit, while a professor at Yale, argued that Cary's analysis was fundamentally
flawed.67 Judge Winters accepted the "race" premise, but he argued that if Professor
incorporated in Delaware would have a
Cary's contentions were true, then businesses
68
fundamental economic disadvantage.
(1) If Delaware permits corporate management to profit at the expense of
shareholders and other states do not, then earnings of Delaware corporations must
be less than earnings of comparable corporations chartered in other states and
shares in the Delaware Corporations must trade at lower prices. (2) Corporations
with lower earnings will be at a disadvantage in raising debt or equity capital. (3)
Corporations at a disadvantage in the capital market will be at a disadvantage in
the product market and their share price will decline, thereby creating a threat of a

takeover which may replace management. 69

Judge Winter agreed that the states did race; however, the result of this race was that
value for
states minimized the cost of doing business and, thus, maximized
70
shareholders. Judge Winter called this race a "race to the top.

62. See id.at 666-68.
63. See id.at 668-70.
64. Id.at 670.
65. See id.at 692-96.
66. Id.at 700-02.
67. Ralph K. Winter, Jr., State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the
Corporation,6 J. LEGAL STUD. 251, 256 (1977) ("With all due respect both to Professor Cary
and to the almost universal academic support for his position, it is implausible on its face.").
68. Id.at 255-56.
69. Id.at 256.
70. Id.
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The "race for the bottom" and "race to the top" debate dominated corporate legal
policy discussions for most of the rest of the century. 71However, starting in the mid1980s, it became clear that neither theory was completely satisfactory.
D. The Takeover Boom and Delaware's Odd Behavior
As early as 1968, the issue of corporate takeovers had become important enough
that Congress deemed it necessary to enact the Williams Act. 72 The Williams Act
added disclosure requirements for an offeror seeking to acquire a block of more than
five percent of any class of security by tender offer and additional disclosure
requirements for any purchaser whose holdings exceed five percent of the outstanding
securities after an acquisition.73
The takeover boom hit its peak in the 1980s.74 In reaction to the high frequency of
takeovers, a number of states passed anti-takeover legislation to protect the current
management of state corporations from "corporate raiders., 75 During this period, two
things happened that do not fit into the "race" dynamic. First, Delaware lagged far
behind in passing anti-takeover legislation. 76 If Professor Cary's theory is correct, then
Delaware should have raced to provide expansive protection for management interests.
Specifically, Delaware should have enacted a statute that would protect current
management's control of the corporation.77 If Judge Winter's theory is correct, and

71. See, e.g., ROMANO,supra note 7, at 14-31 (siding with Judge Winter and updating the
argument through 1993).
72. Williams Act, Pub. L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 454 (1968) (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 15 U.S.C. (2000 & Supp. II 2002)).
73. Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 628 n.2 (1982).
74. See generally JAMES B. STEWART, DEN OF THIEVES (1991) (chronicling the business
scandals of the mid-to-late 1980s, including the high-yield bond boom and bust, the downfall of
Drexel Burnham, and the insider trading scandals).
75. Illinois passed a statute requiring any party offering to acquire an Illinois
corporation to register with the Illinois Secretary of State. ILL. REV. STAT., ch. 121 /2,
137.51-137.70 (1979), invalidated by Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624 (1982). In 1986,
Indiana amended its corporate code with the Control Share Acquisitions Chapter, 1986 IND.
ACTS 149 (codified as amended at IND. CODE § 23-1-42). If a corporation chooses to opt into
this section, voting power will not vest in any party that obtains more than 20%, 33'/%, or
50% of the outstanding stock of the corporation until the remaining shareholders consent by
resolution. IND. CODE §§ 23-1-421 to -9(b) (2005).
76. Roe, supra note 19, at 625-26 ("Other states were producing one pro-managerial antitakeover law after another, only to see them get knocked down at the federal level as preempted
by the Williams Act or the Constitution's dormant commerce clause. Delaware, meanwhile,
waited and passed only a mild anti-takeover law late in the decade.").
77. Cf Cary, supra note 8, at 668-70 (discussing the reasons for Delaware's primacy).
An anti-takeover statute is usually designed to place barriers in the way of a corporation that
tenders a hostile (uninvited) takeover offer. See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT., ch. 121 2,
137.51137.70 (1979). This protects the current management of a company because it gives them
more grounds upon which to contest the offer. Since current management can decide where
to incorporate a company, and assuming that the current management is interested in
protecting its control of the resulting corporation, it follows that current management would
seek to incorporate in the state that has the strongest anti-takeover statute.
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states move in the direction of adopting laws that will maximize shareholder value,
then why did Delaware move in the opposite direction of the vast majority of states?
Second, Delaware initially signaled in Smith v. Van Gorkom that it was willing to
impose a stronger fiduciary duty on current management. 8 Smith v. Van Gorkom
involved a friendly takeover, initiated by the management of the target company. Van
Gorkom, Chairman and CEO of the target-nearing mandatory retirementapproached corporate takeover specialist Jay Pritzker with a proposed takeover price
and financing structure in hand, "without consulting either his Board or any members
of Senior Management except one: Carl Peterson, [the target's] Controller., 79 There
was no evidence to suggest that Van Gorkom did anything more than pick a number
out of thin air to arrive at a takeover price that he thought would attract Pritzker's
attention.8 ° Within weeks, Van Gorkom had presented Pritzker's interest to the Board
of Directors. 8 ' After a two-hour meeting, and based solely on Van Gorkom's oral
presentation, supporting representations, and an attorney's legal advice that failure to
accept the offer might result in a lawsuit, the directors approved the merger agreement
with a few minor amendments. 82 After word of the proposed merger got out, some
shareholders balked at the proposal and brought a lawsuit, claiming that the directors
had breached their duties of loyalty and care by failing to reach an informed business
83

judgment.

The Delaware Supreme Court found for the plaintiffs and concluded that the Board
of Directors had failed to adequately inform themselves of either Van Gorkom's
potential conflict of interest or the intrinsic value of the company.84 Therefore, the
over a dissent, that the Board had been grossly negligent in reaching
court concluded,
85
its decision.

Commentators found this decision "surprisingly aggressive in [its application] ofthe
duty of care to board approval[] of proposed mergers. 8 6 Not surprisingly, so did
corporate directors.8 7 In response to the opinion, Delaware enacted legislation allowing
corporations to limit the liability of their directors for breaches of the duty of care8 8as
long the directors acted in good faith and did not commit intentional misconduct.
If, as Professor Cary's analysis suggests, Delaware's sole public policy is the
promotion of management's interest at the expense of corporate shareholders,8 9 why
did the Delaware Supreme Court even take this step? The rule of this case would
require current management to spend more time and money providing information for
the shareholders-a result which clearly favors the shareholders at the expense of
management. Moreover, if, as Judge Winter suggests, competition between states will

78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

See 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
Id. at 866.
See id.
Id. at 868-69.
Id. at 869.
Id. at 870-71.
Id. at 874.
Id.
Bratton, supra note 24, at 465.
KLEIN ETAL., supranote 50, at 338.
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2001); see also KLEIN ET AL., supra note 50, at 338.
See supratext accompanying note 64.
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promote laws that maximize value for shareholders, 90 how can Delaware's response to
Van Gorkom be justified when it would allow directors in fact situations similar to Van
Gorkom to present takeover proposals to the shareholders without even conducting
valuation studies?
The answer is that both "race" models fail to account for Delaware's responsiveness
to the threat of federal intervention. Delaware feared that if it followed the lead of its
sister states and adopted a pro-management, anti-takeover statute, then the federal
92
91
government would come in and preempt the entire field. In Edgarv. MITE Corp.,
the United States Supreme Court had already declared one anti-takeover statute
unconstitutional under the dormant Commerce Clause. 93 It was not until after the
Dynamics Corp.
Supreme Court backed off of its pro-takeover stance in CTS Corp.9v.
4
direction.
anti-takeover
sharply
a
in
move
to
began
Delaware
that
States with only a few large publicly traded corporations can effectively legislate
below the federal radar. 95 However, Delaware is not one of those states. As home to
more than half of all publicly traded corporations, 96 any pro-management Delaware
initiative is bound to draw federal97attention. And if the federal government does act,
Delaware has a great deal to lose.
E. Enron, Sarbanes-Oxley, and the FederalIntervention
The ultimate problem that led to the "race for the bottom" argument is the agency
cost inherent in separating ownership and management in a corporation. Because of
this separation, the two parties' interests may deviate. 98 "Race for the bottom"
proponents simply argue that the states have chosen one side (management) at the
expense of the other (shareholders).
This clear-cut distinction broke down slightly in the 1990s through the prolific use
of stock options. Institutional investors and other large shareholder groups pushed to
align the interests of management with those of shareholders by compensating
management with stock options. 99 Therefore, each manager would have a personal
incentive to maximize the value of the stock. 100 With this realignment, it became harder
to argue that states allowed management to profit at the expense of shareholders, and
the "race" analogy lost some of its strength. If the interests of two private groups were

90. See supra text accompanying notes 68-69.
91. See Roe, supranote 19, at 628.
92. 457 U.S. 624 (1982).
93. See id. at 643. The statute at issue in this case was an Illinois statute that required an
acquiring company to register all takeover offers with the Illinois Secretary of State when the
target company had a defined minimum connection with the state, regardless of where the
company was incorporated. Id. at 627-28.
94. See Roe, supra note 19, at 628,631-32. For further discussion of CTS, see infra notes
189-97 and accompanying text.
95. Roe, supra note 19, at 628, 631-32.
96. See infra notes 114-15 and accompanying text.
97. See infra Part II.B.
98. See RoMANo, supra note 7, at 1-2.
99. See Karmel, supra note 28, at 104.
100. See id.
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truly aligned, then why should the government get involved in regulating their
relationship at all?
Stock options aligned management and shareholder interests in terms ofthe bottom
line: stock price. More importantly, stock options mollified shareholder concerns about
management actions. Since stockholders saw the increasing stock price and sunny
financial reports, they had little incentive to monitor the managers and directors
closely. However, managers were still concerned with far more than the bottom line.
For example, corporate managers were still very concerned with the threat10 of
2 a hostile
takeover.' 0' Therefore, states still had incentives to satisfy management.
The 1990s were a period defined by the term "irrational exuberance."',0 3 The
prolific use of stock options-the very idea that institutional stockholders championed
as the perfect tool to align management and shareholder interests-was "a key cause of
the 1990s stock market bubble and its collapse."' 1 4 Stock options create a huge
incentive for management to increase the bottom line and, therefore, increase the stock
price, just as the institutional investors intended. However, stock options also create an
equally large incentive for corporations "to manipulate accounting principles and
financial statements" in order to inflate the bottom line and, thereby, increase stock
prices.'l 5
After the accounting scandals at Enron and WorldCom became public in 2002,
states were immediately blamed for lax governance standards that supported an
environment in which boards of directors did not monitor the actions of corporate
officers. 106 In response to these scandals, Congress passed the most far-reaching federal
corporate statute to date, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.107

101. See supra Part I.D.

102. See Bratton, supra note 24, at 458.
103. Jay Mathews, Greenspan Sends Stocks Seesawing; Dow Plunges After Comment,
Rebounds, WASH. POST, Dec. 6, 1996, at Al ("Greenspan voiced out loud what many Wall
Street analysts have been saying for months-that stocks are priced at levels that are out of line
with their companies' intrinsic value-and his apparent endorsement of that idea opened the
door to selling.").
104. Karmel, supra note 28, at 104.
105. See id. at 104-05 (citing John C. Coffee, Jr., What CausedEnron? A Capsule Social
and Economic History of the 1990s, 89 CORNELL L. REv. 269, 275 (2004)).
106. See Andrew Skouvakis, Comment, Exiting the PublicMarkets: A Difficult Choicefor
Small Public CompaniesStruggling with Sarbanes-Oxley, 109 PENN. ST. L. REv. 1279, 1281
(2005) (citing Joann S. Lublin, Inside, Outside Enron, Audit Panel is Scrutinized: Links to
Company of CertainMembers are Called Too Cozy, WALL ST. J., Feb. 1, 2002, at C 1); Albert B.
Crenshaw, Pension Funds Seek Tougher Audit Rules, WASH. POST, Feb. 5, 2002, at El
("Council members emphasized yesterday that they regard boards of directors and other aspects
of corporate governance as the key to preventing further Enrons-even more than auditor
reforms. 'Issues of corporate governance.., have clearly come to roost,' said Damon Silvers of
the AFL-CIO.") (omission in original); Editorial, Cleaning Up the Boardroom, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 8, 2002, at A20 ("[Bush's proposal] fails to address one of the biggest corporate
governance problems revealed by Enron, the need to hold boards of directors more accountable.
One of the most important lessons of Enron is the havoc that can result when oversight by
corporate boards of directors breaks down.").
107. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in scattered
sections of 11, 15, 18, 28 & 29 U.S.C. (Supp. II 2002).
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In an attempt to prevent future scandals, Sarbanes-Oxley implemented significant
changes in at least three important areas. First, the Act established the Public Company
Accounting Oversight Board "to oversee the audit of public companies that are subject
to the securities laws ... in order to protect the interests of investors and further the
public interest in the preparation of informative, accurate, and independent audit
reports."' 0 8 Second, it created new independence requirements for members of the
audit committees of publicly-traded companies' boards of directors. 10 9 Finally, and
most notoriously," 0 the Act required that both the principal executive officer and the
principal financial officer certify the accuracy of all periodic reports filed under the
Securities Exchange Act."i1
Congress drafted these laws to be consistent with the traditional role of federal law
in corporate regulation as one of disclosure, rather than regulation of internal affairs.
However, even though these laws mainly consisted of disclosure and audit
requirements, they have a substantial effect on internal corporate governance. The new
independence requirements are substantive regulations of the makeup of the board of
directors. The certification requirement also has a substantial effect on internal
corporate governance because it requires CEOs and CFOs to establish and maintain
2
new internal financial controls and evaluate the effectiveness of those controls."1
The federal threat to Delaware's dominance in the regulation of internal corporate
affairs was recognized even before Sarbanes-Oxley and the accounting scandals at
Enron and WorldCom."13 However, since 2002, the threat of federal preemption of
Delaware's state business has never been greater.
II. DELAWARE'S

MONOPOLY ON THE STATE INCORPORATION BUSINESS

Delaware is the sixth least populous state in the country, 4 yet fifty percent of all
publicly traded companies and sixty percent of all Fortune 500 companies have
incorporated there. 1 5 What is it about Delaware that continues to attract the majority
of American corporations? More importantly, what does Delaware stand to lose if the
federal government preempts the state chartering business?
A. Reasonsfor Delaware'sSuccess
To maintain its lead, Delaware has invested in a highly specialized and experienced
corporate judiciary, a deep body of case law, and a stable corporate code."' 6 These
assets allow Delaware to stay ahead of competing states through successful innovation

108. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 101.
109. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 301.
110. See Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack Corporate

Governance, 114 YALE L.J. 1521, 1540 (2005) [hereinafter Romano, Quack].
111. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 302.
112. Romano, Quack, supra note 110, at 1540.
113. See Bratton, supra note 24 (written in 2000).
114. State of Delaware, Delaware Economy and People, http://www.state.de.us/
gic/delfacts/people.shtml#Pop (last visited Nov. 9, 2006) [hereinafter Facts].
115. See supra notes 14-15 and accompanying text.
116. Bratton, supra note 24, at 448-52.
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or imitation." 7 First, any litigation involving the interpretation of Delaware corporate
law is channeled into the Delaware Court of Chancery. The Court of Chancery consists
of one chancellor and four vice chancellors.' 1 8 The chancellors are appointed to
twelve-year terms by the governor."19 Because of the amount of business in the state,
the corporate bar is very influential. 20 The bar has a great deal of influence in
Delaware judicial appointments; therefore, those appointed often have significant
backgrounds in business law.' 21This strong judiciary, when combined with Delaware's
long history as incorporation king, has allowed Delaware to develop a very influential
22
body of case law.'

Most importantly, corporations can trust that Delaware corporate law will remain
stable. Delaware can only amend its corporate code with a two-thirds supermajority of
both houses of the legislature.' 23 This stability provides Delaware corporations with a
great degree of predictability-something very important to corporate managers and
the corporate bar. However, this stability has also led some to sarcastically suggest that
Delaware's corporate code boils down to a single principle:
Directors of Delaware corporations can do anything they want, as long as it is not
illegal, and as long as they act in good faith .

.

. provided that "legality" is

understood to be defined in terms of 24
adherence to process rules and bad faith is
understood to be very hard to prove.
Delaware's size is also a major factor in its success.' 25 Since Delaware is so small, it
26
is not subject to as much pressure from labor unions and consumer groups.
Delaware's citizens miss most of the impact of their corporate governance rules
because most of the corporations conduct their business elsewhere. 27 Delaware
citizens also have a strong personal incentive to support the state incorporation
business because, were Delaware to lose its chartering business, those same citizens
would be the party that would lose the most through the greatly increased state tax
burden.

117. See ROMANO, supra note 7, at 9 (noting that "if Delaware is not the pioneer for a
corporate law innovation, it is among the first to imitate").
118. First State Judiciary-Court of Chancery Judges, http://courts.delaware.gov/Courts/
Court of Chancery/?jud off.htm (last visited Nov. 9, 2006).
119. ROMANO, supra note 7, at 39-40.
120. See id.
121. See id.
122. See Bratton, supra note 24, at 451-52.
123. ROMANO, supra note 7, at 41.
124. Bratton, supra note 24, at 467 (quoting Edward B. Rock, Saintsand Sinners:How Does
Delaware CorporateLaw Work?, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1009, 1015 (1997)).
125. Roe, supra note 19, at 594.
126. See id.
127. See id.
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B. What Delaware Stands to Lose
Delaware's success is also its Achilles' heel. In 2004, Delaware collected
$568,190,000 from corporate licenses.128 This accounts for 24% of Delaware's revenue
collection and allows the state to avoid imposing property or general sales taxes.1 29 If
Delaware wished to maintain its current revenue levels after the loss of its chartering
business, the cost would run to $684.57 per person. 130 This figure does not factor in the
potential losses to the Delaware corporate legal community.
Delaware is in a unique position. While it must hold off attacks from other states,
Delaware also must act cautiously or it will incite federal attention. Other states can
afford to ignore the scrutiny of the SEC when they enact pro-management legislation
because the benefit of additional corporate franchise revenue far outweighs the risk of
federal preemption.131 Delaware, on the other hand, is in the spotlight; pro-management
acts by Delaware would likely receive close federal scrutiny, especially after SarbanesOxley.132 In fact, creeping federal intervention into the internal governance of
corporations has already started one fire that could erupt into a raging inferno.
III. NEWCASTLE PARTNERS V. VESTA INSURANCE GROUP
The election of directors by shareholders at a corporation's annual meeting "is a
cornerstone of Delaware corporate law."' 33 Under Delaware law, a corporation must
hold a shareholders' meeting every thirteen months.' 34 After thirteen months, "the
Court of Chancery may summarily order a meeting to be held upon the application of
any stockholder or director."' " There is no requirement that corporate managers
disclose any information to shareholders
as long as they provide the shareholders with
36
a reasonable opportunity to vote.
While annual meetings may be the "cornerstone of Delaware corporate law," the
SEC also heavily regulates them. Before any publicly-traded corporation may hold its
annual meeting, it must provide shareholders with an annual report.137 If a corporation

128. U.S. Census Bureau, State Government Tax Collections: 2004, http://www.census.gov/

govs/statetax/0408destax.html (last visited Nov. 9, 2006) [hereinafter Census].
129. See id.
130. Compare Census, supranote 128 (listing tax collection amounts) with Facts, supra note
114 (listing population).
131. Bratton, supranote 24, at 458.
132. See Roe, supranote 19, at 601-02.
133. Newcastle Partners v. Vesta Ins. Group, 887 A.2d 975,979 (Del. Ch.), aff'd, 906 A.2d
807 (Del. 2005) (unpublished table decision).
134. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 211(c) (2001).
135. Id.
136. See id.

137. This is true whether or not a corporation is soliciting proxies. 17 C.F.R. §240.14a-3(b)
(2005) requires:
If the [proxy] solicitation is made on behalf of the registrant... and relates to an
annual... meeting of security holders, or written consent in lieu of such meeting,
at which directors are to be elected, each proxy statement furnished pursuant to
paragraph (a) of this section shall be accompanied or preceded by an annual report

to security holders ....
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is unable to
distribute an annual report, then the corporation cannot hold its annual
8
meeting. 13
The new certification requirements of Sarbanes-Oxley 139 substantially increase the
costs of putting out an annual report. What happens if a Delaware corporation is unable
to distribute an annual report within thirteen months after its previous annual meeting?
If it holds its meeting without distributing the annual report, then it is subject to fines
by the SEC. If, on the other hand, it does not have its meeting, then the Delaware Court
of Chancery may order it to hold the meeting and, thus, violate the SEC regulation. Just
such a case arose in Newcastle Partnersv. Vesta Insurance Group.140
A. The Case
In Newcastle Partners,the Delaware Court of Chancery confronted a clear conflict
between state law and SEC regulation. Through suspect application of the internal
affairs doctrine, the chancery court concluded that the laws of Delaware controlled,
even if following those laws may subject the corporation to SEC fines.'14
Vesta Insurance Company is an independent insurance agent specializing in
homeowners insurance, automobile insurance, and fire insurance. 42 By the time the
case was ultimately decided on November 15, 2005, Vesta Insurance Group, Inc.
("Vesta") had not held an annual shareholders' meeting to elect directors since June
2004.143 In July 2005, Newcastle Partners, a large shareholder, sued Vesta in the Court
of Chancery, seeking an order that Vesta hold its shareholders' meeting. Since Vesta
had not held a shareholders' meeting in over thirteen months, the court ordered Vesta
44
to hold its meeting within ninety days.'
Vesta moved for relief from this order and argued that the Delaware annual meeting
requirement was in direct conflict with SEC regulations requiring information
disclosures before a shareholders' meeting could be held. 45 Vesta claimed that it could
not publish its annual report or certified financial statements for 2004 before December

Id. In addition, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14c-2(a) (2005) requires:
In connection with every annual ... meeting of [shareholders] ... the registrant
shall transmit a written information statement containing the information specified
in Schedule 14C ... and containing the information specified in... such form, to
every [shareholder] ... entitled to vote.., in regard to any matter to be acted
upon and from whom proxy authorization or consent is not solicited on behalf of
the registrant pursuant to Section 14(a) of the Act.
Id. (emphasis added). See also 17 C.F.R. § 240.14c-3 (2005) ("If the information statement
relates to an annual . .. meeting ... of ... [shareholders] at which directors ... are to be
elected, it shall be accompanied or preceded by an annual report to security holders ....
138.

17 C.F.R. § 240.14c-2(b) (2005).

139. Sarbanes-OxleyAct of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in scattered
sections of 11, 15, 18, 28 & 29 U.S.C. (Supp. 112002)).
140. 887 A.2d 975 (Del. Ch.), affid, 906 A.2d 807 (Del. 2005) (unpublished table decision).
141. Id. at 977.
142. About the Shelby and Vesta Insurance Companies, http://www.vesta.com/about.htm
(last visited Apr. 9, 2006).
143. Newcastle Partners,887 A.2d at 977.
144. Id. The court rendered its initial ruling orally.

145. Id.
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31, 2005.46 Therefore, under SEC Rule Numbers 14a-2, 47 14c-2, 4 s and 14c-3, 49
50
Vesta would be subject to SEC fines if it held its annual meeting before that date.,
The court denied Vesta's motion and ordered Vesta to hold its annual meeting on
November 17, 2005.1 51
The Delaware court reached the right result under the wrong analytical framework.
The Court of Chancery applied the internal affairs doctrine-a rule of conflicts of laws
between states-to analyze a conflict between a state law and a federal regulation. As a
result, the Delaware courts appear to be biting their thumbs at the SEC-suggesting
that Delaware has equal corporate lawmaking power as the federal government.
B. The InternalAffairs Doctrine is an Inappropriate
Vehicle for Discussion of a Federal/StateConflict
The Newcastle Partners court based its opinion on the policy considerations
underlying the internal affairs doctrine of conflicts of law.152 Under the internal affairs
doctrine, only the laws of the state of incorporation govern a corporation's internal
affairs.' 53 This doctrine developed as an outgrowth of the Fourteenth Amendment's
"implicit guarantee of the stockholder's right to 'know by what standards of
accountability
they may hold those managing the corporation's business and
54
affairs."1
This argument is flawed because it fails to recognize the supremacy of federal law
and treats the federal government as if it were just another competing state. Instead, the
Newcastle Partnerscourt attempts to use the internal affairs doctrine to draw a line in
the sand to protect Delaware's dominion over internal corporate governance rules.
The court inappropriately relies on VantagePoint Venture Partners 1996 v.
Examen, Inc. as support for its application of the internal affairs doctrine.
VantagePoint involved an attempt by California to regulate the voting rights of
shareholders in corporations that have contact with California, but are incorporated in
other states.1 55 The California statute in question required that, in connection with 56a
proposed merger, holders of preferred stock were entitled to vote as a separate class.'
Examen, Inc., a Delaware corporation, sought a declaration that the voting rights of

146. Vesta's 2004 annual report was eventually filed on May 25, 2006. Vesta Ins. Group,
Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) (May 25, 2006). As of December 4, 2006, Vesta had yet to
post its annual report for 2004 on its webpage. See Annual Reports, http://www.vesta.com/
vta/annual reports.htm (last visited Dec. 4, 2006).
147. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-2 (2006).
148. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14c-2 (2006).
149. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14c-3 (2006).
150. See supratext accompanying notes 134-38.
151. Newcastle Partners v. Vesta Ins. Group, 887 A.2d 975,977 (Del. Ch.), aff'd, 906 A.2d
807 (Del. 2005) (unpublished table decision).
152. Id. at 981.
153. Id. at 981-82 (citing VantagePoint Venture Partners 1996 v. Examen, Inc., 871 A.2d
1108, 1113 (Del. 2005)); see also supra notes 3-5.
154. Id. at 982 (quoting VantagePoint Venture Partners 1996, 871 A.2d at 1113).
155. VantagePoint Venture Partners 1996, 871 A.2d at 1109-10 n.l (citing CAL. CORP.
CODE § 2115 (West 2006)).
156. Id. at 1110 (citing CAL. CORP. CODE § 1201(a) (West 2006)).
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VantagePoint Venture Partners 1996, a holder of Series A Preferred Stock, were
controlled by Delaware law rather than California law.157 The Delaware Supreme Court
agreed.
The VantagePointcourt concluded that the internal affairs doctrine mandated the
application of Delaware law to the internal affairs of a Delaware corporation.158 The
VantagePointcourt also argued that the Fourteenth Amendment mandates the internal
affairs doctrine; in the context of a conflict between two opposing states, this makes
sense. However, the internal affairs doctrine is a rule of conflicts of law between
different states--coequal sovereigns. Therefore, it is inappropriate to use this doctrine
in the context of a conflict between federal and state law-a situation involving not
coequal sovereigns but rather a supreme sovereign (the federal government) and a
lesser sovereign (the state). 5 9
The internal affairs doctrine developed as an outgrowth of the Full Faith and Credit
Clause, a clause based on the concept of states as coequal sovereigns. The Full Faith
and Credit Clause of the Constitution states: "Full Faith and Credit shall be given in
each State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other
State."'160 An early example of the Full Faith and Credit Clause's application in the
corporate governance context is the case of Broderick v. Rosner.161
Broderick involved a conflict between the superintendent of Banks of the State of
New York, and 557 residents of New Jersey who were shareholders of the Bank of the
United States, incorporated in New York. 162 Under New York law, shareholders of
New York banks were responsible "for all contracts, debts and engagements of the
bank, to the extent of the amount of their stock therein, at the par value thereof, in
addition to the amount invested in such shares."' 63 The superintendent sued in New
Jersey, but the case was dismissed for lack ofjurisdiction. 164New Jersey law denied its
courts jurisdiction to hear any action seeking to impose personal liability on
65
shareholders of corporations, regardless of where the corporation was incorporated.
On appeal to the United States Supreme Court, the New
Jersey statute was held
66
unconstitutional under the Full Faith and Credit Clause.'
The Court reasoned that the contractual nature of incorporation brought the nature
of the case within the scope of the Full Faith and Credit Clause. 167 The "incident of

157. IdatII10--11.
158. Id.atl113.
159. The Restatement (Second) of Conflicts of Law § 302 provides:
The local law of the state of incorporation will be applied to determine... [issues
involving the rights and liabilities of a corporation], except in the unusual case
where, with respect to the particular issue, some otherstate has a more significant
relationship to the occurrence and the parties, in which event the local law of the
other state will be applied.
Id. (alterations added) (emphasis added).
160. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1 (emphasis added).

161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.

294 U.S. 629 (1935).
Id at 638.
Id at 637.
Id.at 638-39.
Id.at 638.
See id.
at 643.

Id.
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incorporation" brought the matter "within the regulatory power of New York."' 68 Since
a shareholder voluntarily decides to enter into a relationship with the corporation, the
shareholder implicitly agrees to accept the public policy decisions of the incorporating
state. Therefore, full faith and credit169must be given to the relative rights and obligations
created by the incorporating state.
Applying Delaware law to override the federal regulation at issue in Newcastle
Partnerscannot, therefore, be said to support "the important policies underlying the
internal affairs doctrine."' 170 While Delaware does have important public policy
concerns that would prevent a court from applying the law of a different state, the
Delaware Supreme Court applies the wrong conceptual framework and, therefore,
emphasizes policies that are inappropriate in a discussion of federal/state conflicts.
Applying the internal affairs doctrine to a conflict between state and federal law
suggests that Delaware's lawmaking power is equal to that of the federal government.
The Delaware legal community may very well wish that were true, but it is not. As we
saw earlier, the federal government has the power to preempt state internal governance
laws. 71 The answer to the court's concern that corporations will not know which law to
apply is simple. Corporations must apply state corporate law and federal securities law,
and where those laws must be harmonized, federal law is supreme. By ignoring this,
the Court of Chancery appears to be biting its thumb at the SEC and picking a fight
where none is required.
C. Analysis Under the Supremacy Clause
Instead of a doctrine derived from the Full Faith and Credit Clause, the Court 1of
72
Chancery should have applied the Supreme Court's Supremacy Clause 73
jurisprudence. While no state's law is inherently superior to that of any other state,
federal law is superior to any state's law. 174 The Supremacy Clause states: "the Laws of
the United States ... shall be the supreme Law of the Land."' 75 The Supreme Court has
established two tests for Supremacy Clause conflicts. First, a state regulation is invalid
"where compliance with both federal and state regulations is a physical
impossibility."' 176 Second, where compliance with both laws is not impossible, a state

168. Id.
169. Id. at 643-44 ("' [T]he act of becoming a member [of a corporation] is something more
than a contract, it is entering into a complex and abiding relation, and as marriage looks to
domicil, membership looks to and must be governed by the law of the State granting
incorporation."') (alterations added) (quoting Modem Woodmen ofAmerica v. Mixer, 267 U.S.
544 (1925)).
170. Newcastle Partners v. Vesta Ins. Group, 887 A.2d 975,981 (Del. Ch.), aff'd, 906 A.2d
807 (Del. 2005) (unpublished table decision).
171. See supranote 56 and accompanying text.
172. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
173. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
174. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
175.

Id.

176. CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp., 481 U.S. 69, 79 (1987) (plurality opinion) (quoting Fla.
Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43 (1963)).
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law is invalid when "the state law stands as an obstacle to the
accomplishment and
77
execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress."',
1. Physical Impossibility
In FloridaLime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul,the Supreme Court provided an
178
example of two laws that would be impossible to satisfy simultaneously.
"[C]ompliance with both federal and state regulations [would be] a physical
impossibility... if, for example, the federal orders forbade the picking and marketing
of any avocado testing more than 7% oil, which the California test excluded from the
State any avocado measuring less than 8% oil content."' 179 However, the court also
points out that, if there is anything that a party could do that would be permissible
under both laws, then the state law is not preempted. 180 This test examines the two
potentially conflicting statutes on their face. The test is completely objective. Ifthere is
any way that a party can satisfy the requirements of both laws, then the federal law
does not preempt the state law on the grounds of physical impossibility.' 81
In Newcastle Partners,compliance with both laws was not a physical impossibility
because Vesta could have completed its disclosures in sufficient time to hold its annual
meeting under the Delaware law. If it had distributed an annual report and information
statement, Vesta would not have violated any of the SEC regulations. While it was
physically impossible for Vesta to complete its disclosures in the two days before the
court-ordered meeting date, this does not amount to a physical impossibility under the
FloridaLime test.
2. Policy Compatibility
In the Newcastle Partnersopinion, the Court of Chancery does provide a cursory
analysis of the interests at play: "there are, of course, some circumstances in which a
state's governance of internal corporate affairs is preempted by federal law, but those
instances are rare, and occur only when the law of the state of incorporation is
'inconsistent with a national policy on foreign or interstate commerce.'"1 82 However,
the court takes this test from the wrong doctrine.
183
The language above originated in the Delaware case of McDermottInc. v. Lewis.
The McDermottInc. case concerned the application of the internal affairs doctrine to a
dispute that involved a Delaware subsidiary of a Panamanian corporation.184 The issue

177. Id. (plurality opinion) (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)).
178. Fla.Lime, 373 U.S. at 143.
179. Id. at 142-43 (alterations added).
180. Id. at 143.
181. See id Since the Supreme Court will only find compliance physically impossible in the
rarest of cases, the question has not been frequently litigated. FloridaLime still stands as the
definitive case on the issue of physical impossibility.
182. Newcastle Partners v. Vesta Ins. Group, 887 A.2d 975,982 (Del. Ch.), aff'd,906 A.2d
807 (Del. 2005) (unpublished table decision) (quoting VantagePoint Venture Partners 1996 v.
Examen, Inc., 871 A.2d 1108, 1113 (Del. 2005)) (alteration added).
183. 531 A.2d 206, 217 (Del. 1987).
184. Seeid. at216-19.
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was whether the Delaware subsidiary could vote its shares in its Panamanian parent, a
practice allowed by Panamanian law.' 85 While a subsidiary would have been unable to
exercise its shares under Delaware law, the Delaware Supreme Court felt compelled by
the internal affairs doctrine to defer to the laws of Panama.
The major policy concern behind the internal affairs doctrine, as the Newcastle
Partnerscourt acknowledges, is the need to avoid conflicting standards of corporate
governance between coequal powers-the states-by declaring a blackletter winner:
the state of incorporation. 186 The policy concerns under the Supremacy Clause are
substantially different. Instead of a coequal sovereign, a federal/state conflict involves
one party-the federal government-that has the constitutional authority to preempt
any state law in any area of federal competence. 187
In those areas where Congress has not completely displaced state regulation, federal
law preempts state law if the state law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishments
and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress. 188 The Supreme Court
applied this doctrine in CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp.189 CTS Corp. involved an antitakeover statute. Under the statute, any shareholder who purchased an ownership
interest in excess of three floors-20%, 331/3%, or 50% of the corporation-was denied
voting rights in the acquired corporation until a majority of the disinterested
shareholders of the target company granted voting power by resolution. 190 Dynamics
Corporation of America ("Dynamics") sought to acquire 27.5% of CTS Corporation
("CTS"). CTS adopted the protection of the Indiana statutes, and Dynamics sued on
the grounds that the Williams Act preempted the Indiana statute.' 91 The Williams
Act' 2 regulates takeover offers in two ways. First, it imposes substantial filing
requirements before an acquiring company
can tender an offer.193 Second, it establishes
94
offer.'
tender
procedural rules for the
Dynamics argued that the Indiana statute reflected the public policy that hostile
takeovers are bad.195 The Indiana Act gives disinterested shareholders-potentially a
group consisting entirely of the current managers of the corporation-a veto over a
hostile takeover offer. If an acquiring company does not know whether it will receive
any voting power in exchange for its purchased stock, the acquirer loses all incentive to
make the tender offer in the first place. Dynamics argued that the offeror's
disadvantages under the Indiana Act upset the delicate balance between shareholders

185. Id. at 208-09.
186. See Newcastle Partners,887 A.2d at 981.
187. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
188. Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 372 (2000); Cal. Fed. Sav. &
Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 281 (1987); CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp., 481 U.S.
69, 79 (1987); Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. Conservation & Dev. Comm'n,
461 U.S. 190, 226 (1983); Fla. Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 14243 (1963); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).
189. 481 U.S. 69.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.

Id. at 73-74.
Id. at 75.
15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)-(e) & 78n(d)-(f) (2000) (amended 2003).
CTS Corp., 481 U.S. at 79.
Id. at 79-80.
See id. at 76-77.
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and managers under the Williams Act. 196 The Supreme Court, painting purpose with a
broad brush, held that the federal law did not preempt because both statutes supported
the same basic purpose: "plac[ing] investors on an equal footing with the takeover
bidder."' 97
It is not necessary to fudge the purposes behind the proxy regulations and the annual
meeting requirement to conclude that they are in harmony. The important policy
behind the SEC's proxy regulations was considered by the Supreme Court in Mills v.
98
"[t]he provision was intended to promote 'the free exercise
ElectricAuto-Lite Co.:'1
of the voting rights of stockholders' by ensuring that proxies would be solicited with
'explanation to the stockholder of the real nature of the questions for which authority to
cast his vote is sought." ' 199 This public policy does not conflict with Delaware's stated
public policy of protecting a shareholder's franchise. 2°
That does not mean that there is no tension between the two laws. The opinion
stressed the importance of an actual and informed vote. 20 1 Therefore, even though
Delaware and the federal government both have a policy of supporting the
shareholder's franchise, the federal government has chosen to emphasize full
disclosure. Since Delaware's law may frustrate this purpose, the preemption rubric
might suggest that Delaware's law should give way. The question ultimately requires a
court to determine how much deference a state statute should receive. On this issue,
however, the Supreme Court has issued conflicting standards.
The Supreme Court has issued conflicting statements on when there is a
presumption against preemption. There is a presumption against finding preemption of
state law in areas traditionally regulated by the states.20 2 However, no presumption
arises when the state regulates in an area where there has been a history of significant
federal presence.20 3 This raises the question of whether or not there is a presumption
against preemption in an area where states have traditionally regulated and where the
federal government has had a history of significant presence. This "Schr6dinger's cat"
of presumptions was not discussed by the Delaware Court of Chancery.

196.
197.
(1977)).
198.
199.

See id. at 82 n.7.
Id.at 82 (alterations in original) (quoting Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., 430 U.S. 1, 30
396 U.S. 375 (1970).
Id.at 381 (citing H.R. REP. No. 73-1383, at 14 (1934)).

200. Newcastle Partners v. Vesta Ins. Group, 887 A.2d 975,981 (Del. Ch.), af'd,906 A.2d

807 (Del. 2005) (unpublished table decision).
201. Mills, 396 U.S. at 381.
202. See California v. ARC Am. Corp., 490 U.S. 93, 100 (1989).
203. United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89, 109 (2000).
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The court's actions do not lead to the wrong result. 204 Shareholders should be
allowed to exercise their franchise over a corporation on a periodic basis. Annual
meetings accomplish just that: they allow shareholders to maintain some levelhowever low--of consistent control over managers and directors of the corporation.
However, the court reached its conclusion using a flawed analytical framework. Had
the court balanced the public policies under the correct conceptual framework, it would
have a strong argument for the result ordered. However, through application of the
internal affairs doctrine, Delaware insists on asserting its ultimate authority as
corporate lawgiver.
D. The Result
For the parties involved, the result was that Vesta held its shareholders' meeting
without filing its annual report. For Delaware, the case now stands for the principle that
the internal affairs doctrine requires Delaware law to prevail over federal rules that
regulate the internal affairs of a corporation. This hostile attitude is inconsistent with
Delaware's history of avoiding conflict with the federal government. 20 5 With the
increase in federal regulation of internal corporate governance, it is easy to see why
Delaware might be worried that it will lose its state business. Many commentators have
recently suggested that the end of state control of corporate law is at hand.20 6 However,
the political momentum for federal regulation has slowed slightly.207 Newcastle
Partnersinvolved a clear instance where state law could legitimately control, at a time
when political turmoil in Washington had slowed the corporate governance reform
movement; therefore, the case offered an excellent opportunity for Delaware to take a
swipe at the federal government and reassert its authority as corporate lawgiver.
Newcastle Partnershas misapplied the internal affairs doctrine-a doctrine only
applicable to a conflict between two coequal sovereigns-to a conflict between the
state and the federal government. Now that Delaware has unleashed the beast, the state
and the federal governments are set on a collision course. As we have already seen with
Sarbanes-Oxley, the federal government has recently flirted with substantive
regulations of internal corporate affairs.208 What if the federal government decides to

204. The same day that Vesta held their annual meeting, they reached a settlement agreement
with Newcastle Partners in which Vesta agreed to expand the size of the board by one member.
In exchange, Newcastle Partners agreed to withdraw its three director nominations and accept
Vesta's slate of directors. Vesta Ins. Group, Inc., Entry Into a Material Definitive Agreement
(Form 8-K) (Nov. 22, 2005). Vesta has also fired the accounting firm responsible for the delay
in the distribution of its annual report for 2004. Vesta Ins. Group, Inc., Changes in Registrant's
Certifying Accountant (Form 8-K) (Dec. 9, 2005). Due to Vesta's inability to fulfill its
disclosure requirements, its stock has been delisted by the New York Stock Exchange. Vesta
Ins. Group, Inc., Notice of Delisting or Failure to Satisfy a Continued Listing Rule or Standard;
Transfer of Listing (Form 8-K) (Jan. 3, 2006).
205. See supra Part I.D.
206. See, e.g., Loewenstein, supranote 21, at 353.
207. Cf Renee M. Jones, Dynamic Federalism:Competition, Cooperation,and Securities
Enforcement, 11 CONN. INS. L.J. 107, 117 (2004) (discussing the SEC's recent unwillingness to

adequately enforce its own regulations).
208. See supra notes 106-11 and accompanying text.
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go further and adopt minimum fiduciary standards of care for corporate directors and
officers-a rule that Professor Cary suggested in his article on the "race to the
bottom"? Delaware has declared that the internal affairs rule requires the state to
prevail over conflicting internal governance standards. Would Delaware be so bold as
to extend this doctrine in a case where the policy considerations are not so clearly
aligned?
The SEC can avoid many of these problems if it simply asserts its authority. First,
the SEC should fine Vesta because Vesta clearly violated SEC Rules 14c-2 and 214c3209 when it held an annual meeting without first distributing an annual report. 0 If
Vesta is not fined, then companies will look to state courts to order shareholders'
meetings to avoid the federal disclosure requirements.
Second, the SEC should issue a statement that the proxy disclosure requirements do
not preempt state laws on meeting frequency. Practitioners have complained that the
SEC's silence on the issue has created confusion.21 If the SEC acknowledges that state
meeting frequency laws must be respected, the practitioners will accept the state law as
a deadline for meeting proxy disclosure requirements.
Finally, the SEC could respond by setting time limits in the proxy regulations for
disclosure requirements. While this case may have come out with the right result from
a public policy perspective, it would have been far better if the SEC had set time limits
and avoided the controversy in the first place. Time limits would provide clear
guidance to corporations, as a corporation would no longer be required to look in two
places-state law and federal law-to determine annual meeting requirements.
CONCLUSION

Delaware has dominated the corporate chartering scene since the presidency of
Woodrow Wilson. In that time, Delaware has fought competing states and the federal
government to maintain its market position. Delaware has shown great resilience at
every turn. After Sarbanes-Oxley, the landscape has changed dramatically. Newcastle
Partnersis but the first fight in what could be a lengthy battle for national corporate
supremacy.
Delaware would be much better served if it were to acknowledge the federal
government's supremacy. The internal/external distinction between state and federal
regulation is eroding.212 Many scholars already acknowledge that the SEC
overwhelmingly dominates the regulation ofthe annual election of directors.213 It might
be time for Delaware to take a step back, contract the scope of its operations, and find
new ways in which it can continue to add value for its incorporating "clients."

209. 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.14c-2 to -3 (2005).
210. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14c-3 (2005). Vesta held its annual meeting on November 17, 2005.
Vesta Ins. Group, Inc., Entry Into a Material Definitive Agreement (Form 8-K) (Nov. 22,2005).
211. Morris, Nichols, Arsht & Tunnell LLP, Delaware Court of Chancery Suggests That
Federal Securities Regulations Do Not Trump State Annual Meeting Law, Dec. 15, 2005,
http://www.mnat.com/assets/attachments/27.pdf.
212. See supraPart I.E.
213. See, e.g., Roe, supra note 19, at 612.

